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Andrew S Pullin* and Teri M KnightEnvironmental scientists regularly receive encourage-
ment to engage with both their policy counterparts and
wider society, to increase the effectiveness with which
they communicate their science and to demonstrate its
beneficial impact on wider society [1-3]. A significant
body of literature now exists on ways in which environ-
mental scientists might engage with non-scientists and
be understood [4] and representative scientific societies
and funders of science provide advice on how scientists
can increase their impact (e.g. Ecological Society of
America, British Ecological Society, UK Natural Environ-
ment Research Council) and, in some cases, provide
funds and training for such activities. The need for good
science to inform environmental policy decisions is ar-
guably more urgent than ever before and it follows that
good translation of science both for policy communities
and wider society, needs encouragement, but it does also
need some methodological basis.
The development of mutual understanding between
scientist and policy maker of the role of scientific evi-
dence in informing policy is critical to effective environ-
mental management. A higher profile and greater media
coverage such engagement might provide are potentially
good things for environmental science and scientists.
The value of original research needs greater appreciation
by those who might pay for it (tax payers, donors). Truly
novel and groundbreaking research should be widely
and accurately reported using skilled journalism to ex-
plain often complex issues to a lay readership or viewing
audience. But, along with these positives there are po-
tential negatives when scientists or vested interest
groups compete for attention to promote one piece of
research as more important or interesting than another.
Communicating science to a wider audience is already
something of an industry. Many publishers now seek to
gain media coverage for individual papers and
summarize the findings of key papers in dedicated* Correspondence: a.s.pullin@bangor.ac.uk
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumsections of their journals to broaden their impact. Of
course, where there is commercial interest there will al-
ways be selective relationships between scientists and
those that might seek to exploit the results. Many orga-
nisations provide a service for those who wish to trans-
late their outputs and increase their impact in a
commercial setting (e.g. healthcare [5]). Putting com-
mercial interests to one side, there are many situations
in which collective (rather than selective) scientific evi-
dence should be used for the collective good of society;
public health and environmental management are per-
haps two examples. Unfortunately, in contrast to public
health, there is no widely adopted mechanism in envir-
onmental management to facilitate this process.
Whilst we recognise that the translation of environ-
mental science into policy is not a simple linear process
[6] and that there are many other factors that influence
policy decisions, there are also cases where science has
been fundamental to the policy change. Although we
may all be able to name some good examples (e.g. com-
bating acid rain and protection of the ozone layer), the
threat always exists of bad science being more effectively
communicated than good [7]. Examples illustrating a
number of potential dangers of promoting individual
studies or sectoral opinion of science, with the intention
of influencing policy, have been recorded in the health
sciences. In the health sector, such issues are often acute
and have been extensively studied. The following list
serves as a ‘health warning’ and is only illustrative and
not exhaustive.
The first problem concerns apparently conflicting
findings, timescale and scientific progress. Findings of
early research in human nutrition led to development of
guidance which, as research progressed, was demon-
strated to have been too simplistic. For example, early
advice for diabetics was to follow a low carbohydrate
diet; the reasoning being that carbohydrates are metabo-
lised to glucose which is problematic for diabetics. How-
ever, later research demonstrated that such extreme
dietary restrictions are not necessary and so the newntral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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taining ‘simple’ sugar – rather than all carbohydrates. To
the general public however, this can be interpreted as a
U-turn on policy, which can lead to lack of confidence
in the ability of scientists to get it right.
Often apparent lack of consensus arises, not because
the science changes, but because selective messages are
given out by those with vested interests. If such mes-
sages are more effectively promoted than the actual sci-
ence, the general public may find it difficult to
differentiate between sources of information; “....but
they say now that it isn’t bad for you after all!”. To the
recipient, sound scientific advice becomes one and
the same as marketing materials and subjective media
opinion. In such cases, it can be difficult to pursue
a consistent policy in the face of apparently contradict-
ory science.
A different problem arises when high quality science
accumulates that challenges current dogma. Despite the
weight of evidence shifting there is no direct or timely
translation into policy or practice if the translators (indi-
viduals or groups) are themselves overly ‘conservative’ or
have long held ‘beliefs’ in which they have invested time,
effort and reputation. Science often moves faster than an
individual’s or group’s opinion of the current evidence. A
landmark example of the dangers of overreliance on
established expert opinion was provided by Antman
et al. [8] who were concerned with the use of thrombo-
lytic therapy (so-called ‘clot-busting’ drugs) in Acute
Myocardial Infarction (heart attack) (AMI). They exam-
ined “conventional expert wisdom”: analysing ’expert’ re-
view articles and textbook chapters to see what
recommendations these made about the use of the ther-
apy in AMI and found that it was not until 1986 that
the majority of experts recommended it as a routine
treatment. They then searched for all Randomised Con-
trol Trials of thrombolytic therapy in AMI, undertook a
cumulative meta-analysis of the data and showed the
clear benefit of the therapy in reducing death from AMI.
Their analysis demonstrated that this benefit became
clear around 1975, some 10 years earlier than when use
of the therapy in AMI was regarded as ‘routine’ in expert
texts. Even then, there were some textbooks/reviews
which did not mention thrombolytic therapy at all or
were still reporting it as ‘experimental’. During those
intervening years, it is quite probable that thousands of
people with AMI died, who could have survived, if the
evidence had been systematically gathered and synthe-
sised and the findings effectively communicated and ap-
plied by ‘experts’.
A third problem is that of ‘myth generation’ where a
story is given the status of being science-based, through
repeated assertion and dissemination, or where ‘weak’
evidence is acted upon as if it were strong. Mythgeneration occurs in at least the following two different
contexts.
The first case is where a policy is in place that is to
some extent based on evidence and a myth is generated
based on inferior science that undermines that policy.
The so-called ‘MMR controversy’ in the UK is a salutary
lesson in the dangers of one study being promoted (in
this case by the non-scientific media and some stake-
holder groups) without due criticism of its quality and
without reference to the cumulative evidence-base; ei-
ther because the messengers are not equipped with the
skills to assess the science and/or because to do so
would ruin the story or oppose their beliefs. In 1998, a
paper by Wakefield et al. was suggestive of a link be-
tween the ‘triple vaccine’ for Measles, Mumps and Ru-
bella (MMR) and the onset of autistic spectrum disorder
in children [9]. The paper was widely reported in the
British media and sparked a rapidly escalating public de-
bate about the safety of the vaccine. Despite key and
high-level statements about the problems with the study
and the strength of the evidence-base which demon-
strated no such links, uptake of the first dose of the
MMR vaccination by age two years in the UK population
fell from 92% before the controversy (1995/6), to just
under 80% by 2003/04 [10]. The World Health Organ-
isation recommends that immunity levels of 95% are
needed to prevent outbreaks of disease [11] and in Eng-
land and Wales there were 56 confirmed cases of mea-
sles in 1998, 438 in 2003 and 1370 in 2008 [12]. The
original paper has since been retracted by Wakefield’s
co-authors [13]. Efforts to promote the results of single
studies without critical appraisal and out of context of
the background evidence-base will run the risk of undue
attention being given to a fragment of the evidence-base
with the possible consequences of a damaging ‘MMR’
type fiasco in environment management.
A second case of myth generation is where there is a
need for evidence on which to base policy and some in-
formation comes to light to fill the void. The informa-
tion may be based on poor science but is acted upon as
if it were much sounder than it really is. An environ-
mental example comes from Australia, where the cane
toad (Bufo marinus) is an invasive alien species that was
originally introduced as a potential biological control
agent, but today serves as a textbook example of how
such plans can go badly wrong. The cane toad is still
spreading through Northern Australia threatening many
native species, due to its toxicity to almost anything that
tries to eat it, and costing many millions of dollars in
attempts to control it. No surprise then that any scien-
tific finding that might address this problem would be
quickly assimilated by the policy community. In their
paper appropriately titled ‘The myth of the toad-eating
frog’ Shine et al. [14] describe a circulating story
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the native frog Litoria dahlii was able to consume the
tadpoles and eggs of the cane toad without ill effect and
were therefore a potential agent with which to combat
the invader. Some scientific credibility had been given to
this claim by a short article in a scientific journal [15]
and the story was subsequently widely reported in the
media. However the study design described in this article
appears flawed and Shine et al. report on a subsequent
more rigorous replicated laboratory trial which suggests
that L. dahlii is no different from other native frog spe-
cies in being susceptible to cane toad toxin and suffering
significant mortality when attempting to feed on cane
toad tadpoles. This example illustrates how apparently
science-based information can be picked up by the
media as an interesting story, without any critical ap-
praisal of its validity, and become accepted as evidence
on which to base action.
At the core of these examples is the fundamental
problem of bias. None of us is free from it and just as
there are sound reasons for using experimental method-
ology to reduce the influence of bias in primary re-
search, we need methodologies that perform the same
role in translation of evidence to inform decisions. There
are many forms but simple selection bias, where a single
study can be actively seized upon and promoted by par-
tisan groups because it strengthens their stance, is an
adequate example here. The MMR story is a case of this,
where those opposed to the vaccine in principle contrib-
uted to the media promotion of Wakefield’s study. The
field of nutrition yields examples of the food industry
selecting and promoting single studies, regardless of
their research quality, which support their marketing
claims even though they might be counter to the evi-
dence base as a whole [7]. Members of the public may
find it difficult to identify when scientific information is
coming from an independent scientific body or from
those with a vested interest. Apparently conflicting infor-
mation may be interpreted as a lack of scientific consen-
sus making it easier for a biased point of view to be
promoted by those with clever marketing and big bud-
gets. There is potential advantage in presenting conflict-
ing findings as lack of consensus, particularly if that
consensus is likely to be harmful to one’s enterprise. The
tobacco industry has been able to use this tactic for
many years and the climate change sceptics have waged
a similar media offensive. There are many genuine con-
flicts in environmental management where stakeholder
groups seek to use science to press their case (e.g. fisher-
ies management, alternative energy generation, industrial
pollution, pest control) and policy must see through any
bias and objectively assess the weight of evidence.
Along with providing examples that warn of biased
use of science there are useful lessons to be learnt fromthe experience of the health sector in combating the
problem. A shared evidence base formed using a recog-
nised methodology, open not only for information but
also for critical appraisal and contribution, has the po-
tential to reduce error and bias, dilute the impact of
vested interest and absorb the latest evidence into a syn-
thesis of all available evidence. Evidence synthesis pro-
vides a buffer against irresponsible reporting of scientific
findings (e.g. through media or vested interest groups).
The evidence base acts both as a benchmark of current
knowledge and a filter of new findings. Random interjec-
tion of evidence without filter is inefficient and can be
extremely costly. The evidence base should be formed by
openly collaborative independent organisations using sys-
tematic review and evidence synthesis methodologies to
provide an independent consensus view that is constantly
updatable as new science becomes available. Examples are
familiar in the health service (e.g. www.cochrane.org), but
also exist in social justice, education and international
development (e.g. www.campbellcollaboration.org).
Environmental policy should be informed by an evi-
dence base that the environmental community shares
and not be unduly influenced by the latest finding,
the largest effect, the most interesting result, or the
most contradictory or controversial. The concept is
simple; new findings are reported in the context of
the existing evidence base and not as isolated, inde-
pendent fragments of science. An equivalent inde-
pendent organisation in the environmental sector is
now functional ([16]; www.environmentalevidence.org)
but is yet to be as influential as in other sectors.
Form and function are well developed and the key
challenge is to grow to the size (the number of sys-
tematic reviews of relevant questions and equivalent
information) required to be considered mainstream
practice. So who contributes and who pays? If the
Collaboration for Environmental Evidence is to grow
to the required size and level of activity a broad
spectrum of environmental scientists needs to become
engaged in systematic review and evidence synthesis.
Unfortunately incentives are few but there are signs
that this is changing. Whilst there is no clear funding
stream to develop evidence-based practice in the en-
vironmental sector and no career structure within
institutions that encourages the development of ex-
pertise in systematic review and evidence synthesis,
there are early signs of increases in both demand-led
activity from commissioners requiring an evidence
base and bottom up activity from scientists wanting
to test and improve the methodology in their field.
With a collective effort among multiple actors in the
environmental sector an effective and rapid expansion of
evidence-based practice and evidence-informed decision
making can be achieved. We suggest the policy
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pendent evidence-base in environmental management
by (1) demanding rigorous systematic reviews when
commissioning work to address needs for evidence; (2)
discouraging ‘special relationships’ between scientists
(including representatives of vested-interest groups and
subsets of the science community such as government-
funded centres) and policy formers and (3) engaging
experts in critical appraisal of the evidence and avoiding
overreliance on expert opinion to establish the evidence
base. We further suggest research funders should en-
courage the development of evidence synthesis as a spe-
cialism and promote evidence synthesis alongside
applied primary research programmes. Evidence synthe-
sis serves as a pathway to impact, as an identifier of
knowledge gaps and primary research priorities and as
an independent assessor of the quality of the science
being funded. For example, consider the idea that the
policy impact of a paper may be objectively measured by
whether or not it has been included in a systematic re-
view commissioned by an appropriate policy body. Add-
itionally, the methodological quality of that paper could
be objectively measured by its impact on the systematic
review outcome in comparison with other included
papers. If policy impact is to become a measure of as-
sessment of individual research outputs then there is po-
tential for the ‘every-researcher for himself ’ scenario of
evidence dissemination to get worse as researchers are
pressurised to provide evidence of impact. This will not
help develop objective measures of impact but will in-
crease the problems listed above. Alternatively the pro-
motion of a synthetic approach to policy-relevant
science might improve the evidence base and provide a
more objective measure of the impact of individual
papers.
The value and credibility of science is undermined by
examples such as those given above. Translation of sci-
ence to inform policy should be an ordered process with
rules to minimise bias equivalent to those established for
primary research. In environmental sciences it seems we
are still being encouraged to engage in an entrepreneur-
ial free-for-all effort to promote individual studies to the
policy community, a state that the health scientists have
fought against for some 20 years. Are we going to learn
from their pioneering efforts or perform a costly re-
invention of the wheel?
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